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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a methodology based on piecewise homogeneous
Markov chain for credit ratings and a multivariate model of the credit spreads to
evaluate the financial risk in European Union (EU). Two main aspects are consid-
ered: how the financial risk is distributed among the European countries and how
large is the value of the total risk. The first aspect is evaluated by means of the
expected value of a dynamic entropy measure. The second one is solved by com-
puting the evolution of the total credit spread over time. Moreover, the covariance
between countries’ total spread allows understand any contagions in the EU. The
methodology is applied to real data of 24 European countries for the three major
rating agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. Obtained results suggest
that both the financial risk inequality and the value of the total risk increase over
time at a different rate depending on the rating agency and that the dependence
structure is characterized by a strong correlation between most of European coun-
tries.
keywords: Sovereign credit rating, Markov process, Dynamic measure of inequal-
ity, Copula, Change-point
1 Introduction
The interest on the sovereign securities has increased after the occurrence of some
sovereign defaults and financial crisis. In particular, the Eurozone has become of main
interest, considering the economic and financial implications given by the integration
of countries. Following our previous works ( [14]- [15]) we aim at gaining insight on
one of the financial implications arising from the economic union of European coun-
tries. Specifically, we focus on the financial risk related to each country and to the
European Union as a whole. We refer to financial risk as the countries’ ability to face
with their financial obligations. It is expressed by the amount of credit spread, that
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depends on the sovereign credit rating assignment. In particular, there are two main
questions we want to reply. The first one concerns the distribution of this risk among
European countries. The second one refers to the size of the risk faced by the whole set
of countries. Therefore, the purpose of the present work is to understand the behaviour
of the financial risk focusing both on the evolution of its total size and the assessment of
the inequality of the risk distribution among countries. The European Union has been
analysed focusing on different problems. As a matter of example the public debt and its
ownership is investigated in [23]; in [1] the authors studied dependence of default risk
of several Eurozone countries. While the problem about the income inequality has been
faced in [7]. Changes in European structure given by the exit of some members is anal-
ysed in [18] and [3]. The influence of rating dynamics on the credit spread evolution
has been highlighted in financial literature by [10] and [21], mainly concerning indus-
try sector. Another source of dependence for the credit spread evolution can be found
in [11]. In this work the authors proposed a bivariate semi-Markov reward approach to
include the counterpart credit risk. Others works proposed the application of a Copula
to capture dependencies see [12], [16], [17] and [28]. However, these applications do
not concern credit spread modelling. Regarding the credit rating studies, rating mod-
elling includes the Markov processes (see [2]- [4]- [22]- [24]) and the semi-Markov
processes (see, among others, [6], [9] amd [25]). Furthermore, sovereign credit ratings
have been modelled by means of Markov processes (see, e.g. [20], [19], [26] ). Infor-
mation theory is also applied to economic and financial issues. In particular, dynamic
inequality measures can be found in [13] where the authors proposed a dynamic exten-
sion of common poverty indices. In [7] the authors proposed a dynamic measurement
of income inequality based on the Theil index, and successively a decomposition of
this measure has been advanced in [8]. The measure of inequality we propose in order
to evaluate the financial risk is based on the last two contributions. Interestingly, the
topic we are working on has never been faced in financial literature. We give a contri-
bution on the existent literature by proposing a copula based Markov reward approach
to model credit spread dynamics and to evaluate the financial risk. In particular, the
questions we posed are solved by the assessment of the dynamic Theil index for the
financial inequality measurement and by the computation of the total credit spread for
the quantification of the total risk in European Union. Furthermore, an analysis of the
dependence structure is carried out by means of the covariance between countries’ total
credit spread. The model has been implemented for three rating agencies: Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, to find out if there are differences stemming from the
dissimilarities of the rating assignment process.
Obtained results show that: the financial inequality is increasing in the future for all
three agencies, although the values evolve differently over time. The total financial
risk also increases with dissimilarities depending on the rating agency; the dependence
structure is characterized by a strong correlation between countries. The paper is orga-
nized as follows: the second Section analyse the data while the third one describes the
model. Section 4 presents the indicators computed to evaluate financial risk, i.e. the
dynamic inequality measure, the total credit spread and the covariance between coun-
tries’ total credit spread. In Section 5 empirical results are discussed, followed by the
concluding remarks.
2
2 Data analysis
Our research objective is to provide a model able to measure inequality in the financial
risk in a set of countries (or financial entities) and to assess the evolution in time of the
total risk. To this end, we focused our attention on European countries and we collected
data on two main financial variables: the sovereign credit ratings and the credit spreads.
Sovereign credit rating is an ordinal measure of the country’s credit risk. It expresses
the ability of a country to face its financial commitments. Credit spreads are also
collected, they are the difference between interest rates of various countries. It is well
known that credit spread depends on sovereign credit rating assignment, see e.g. [15].
The sovereign credit rating assigned to the European countries by the three major
rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, has been collected. Thus, we
built three different datasets, one for each rating agency, collecting rating histories from
November 23, 1998 to June 26, 2018 on a daily scale. The data are gathered from the
Tradingeconomics website and grouped into eight rating classes as shown in Table 1.
The rating class 1 is the best rating assignment meaning that the issuer has an excep-
Moody’s Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-Ca C
S&P AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC-CC-C SD-D
Fitch AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC-CC-C RD-D
rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Table 1: Rating class classification for each rating agency
tionally strong capacity to cope with its financial commitments. Lower credit rating
assignments, i.e. 2, ...,7, imply the belief that the issuer is gradually less able to face
with its financial commitments. Rank 8 denotes financial default. As not all data were
available for all European countries the sample is composed by 24 members: Belgium,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croa-
tia, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Rating assignments are almost stables, in fact there are few transitions. We observed
1998/2007 2008/2014 2015/2018
S&P upgrades 55.18 10.34 34.48
downgrades 6.25 78.12 15.63
Moody’s upgrades 66.67 4.16 19.17
downgrades 0 88.89 11.11
Fitch upgrades 64.29 10.71 25
downgrades 12.5 78.13 9.37
Table 2: upgrades/downgrade distribution over time for all rating agencies ( % )
61, 51, 60 transitions for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. In particular, the up-
grades / downgrades (transition to a better / lower rating class) are concentrated in dif-
ferent periods. Table 2 illustrates the percentage of upgrades/downgrades experienced
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by all countries according to the three rating agencies assignment in three sub-periods:
1998-2007, 2008-2014, 2015-2018. According to Table 2, the downgrades are mostly
concentrated in the period ranging between 2008 and 2014 covering the financial crisis
and the Greek crisis: 78,12% for S&P, 88.89% for Moody’s and 78.13% for Fitch. On
the other hand, the 55.18%, 66.67% and 64.29% of upgraded is observed before the
2008 for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. While the rest of upgrades are mostly
concentrated in the period spreading between the 2015 and 2018. Figure 1 shows the
timing of the upgrades and the downgrades for Moody’s. As it is possible to see, be-
fore the 2008 there were no downgrades and the percentage of upgrades during the
2008-2014 is smaller than the other agencies.
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Figure 1: number of upgrades/downgrades observed over Moody’s data.
The second variable we need is the credit spread. Generally, the credit spread is
given by the difference between the interest rate and a benchmark. The benchmark we
use to compute the credit spread is the minimum value among the interest rates paid by
all European countries. The reason underlying this choice is that there are some coun-
tries experiencing lower interest rates than Germany. Consequently, it allows to avoid
negative spreads. Thus, the credit spread can be interpreted as the premium for the
higher risk paid by a given country compared to the ideal situation where the country
pays the minimum value. Therefore, the long-term interest rate of sovereign govern-
ment bonds are collected from the investing.com web-site, on a daily scale. The data
are available for all countries only starting from April, 26, 2010. Thus, the observation
period ranges between this date and June 26, 2018. Figure 2 shows the evolution of
the interest rate and the credit spread paid in European Union over the observed pe-
riod. After a peak around the end of 2011 and the start of 2012, both indicators show
a decreasing trend. The difference between them is relevant until the 2012 and then it
decreases, suggesting that the minimum value has decreased over time. This difference
is ,in fact equal to the minimum value of interest rates multiplied by the number of
considered countries.
Moreover, analysis on the spread times series shows that European countries are
positively correlated, being the coefficient of correlation between most of countries
higher than 0,5. However, exceptions are represented by Denmark, Sweden and United
Kingdom. According to Figure 3, these countries are negatively correlated with respect
to all other countries, but they are positively correlated between each other. Figure 4
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Figure 2: observed evolution of the total credit spread and total interest rate
shows the correlation coefficient estimated between 2 different sub-sets of countries
and the whole set. In the left panel Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovenia are rep-
resented, while in the right one Belgium, Germany and Italy are shown1. Bulgaria,
Czech Republic and Slovenia are positively correlated with all other countries (except
for Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom) as the second group. However, the posi-
tive / negative correlation of the first group is smaller / higher than the second one.
The peculiarities of the data shown above push us to propose a model that general-
izes that of our previous works (see [15] and [14]). The ratings dynamics are modelled
according to a piecewise homogeneous Markov chain in order to include changes in rat-
ing dynamics and to explain the different behaviour illustrated in Table 1. Moreover,
the inclusion of a stochastic process describing the spread evolution and its depen-
dence among countries allows for the high correlation among countries. Details about
the proposed methodology are given in the next section.
3 Modelling rating and credit spread dynamics
Let C be a set of N countries. At any time t ∈ N (discrete times can refer to months,
weeks or days, depending on the granularity of the study), each country c ∈ C is
rated by financial agencies; its rating assignment xc(t) belongs to an ordered set E :=
{1,2, ...,D}, where D denotes the number of possible rating assignments. The rating
assignment of a country aims at reflecting the financial viability of the country and
is derived from the financial, economic, fiscal and political situations of the country2.
As usually done in credit rating studies, the sequences xc(t), c ∈ C are assumed to be
realizations of stochastic processes Xc := (Xc(t))t∈N, c ∈ C .
At the same time, a country c can borrow money from financial institutions (or
from the private investors) up to the application of an interest rate irc(t). Again, the
sequences irc(t), c ∈ C , are assumed to be realizations of stochastic processes IRc :=
1It is worth noting that we represent only this sub-sets as they are representative of the whole group. The
rest of the countries have a correlation structure which is similar to that of Belgium, Italy and Germany and
that of Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovenia. Whereas the first group has a different structure.
2See the rating policies of the three agencies mentioned above on their web sites.
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Figure 3: Correlation coefficient of the credit spread’s time series between Denmark
(black line), Sweden (dashed line), United Kingdom (gray line) and all other countries.
BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, IE:
Ireland, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FR: France, HR: Croatia, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, HU:
Hungary, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, AT: Austria PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO:
Romania, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, FI: Finland, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom
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Figure 4: Left panel: Correlation coefficient of the credit spread’s time series between
Bulgaria (dashed line), Czech Republic (black line), Slovenia (gray line) and all other
countries. Right panel: correlation coefficient between Belgium (black line), Germany
(dotted line), Italy (gray line) and all other countries.
(IRc(t))t∈N. From the interest rates, we derive the credit spreads sc(t), c ∈ C at any
time t: for a country c, it is the difference between the interest rate (irc(t)) paid at time
t and the minimum value among all interest rates at the same time. Precisely,
sc(t) := irc(t)−min
d∈C
{ird(t)}, (1)
or, in terms of processes, Sc := IRc−min
d∈C
IRd .
The processes Xc and Sc evolve jointly: unfavourable situations for country c yield
low rating by agencies and high interest rate and possibly high credit spread (if the
situation of the country paying the minimum value is less unfavourable).
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Let us now describe the modelling for the rating and credit spread processes. The
following assumptions hold all along the paper.
Assumption 1. The processes Xc, c ∈ C , are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.).
In the following, we shall denote by X a process drawn from their common distri-
bution.
Assumption 1 is motivated by theoretical and practical requirements: we need the
model to be simple and flexible so as to perform estimation. In addition, due to the
sparsity of data, the estimation of a correlation structure between countries may be a
difficult task.
Assumption 2. The process X is a piecewise homogeneous Markov chain taking values
in the ordered finite set E = {1, . . . ,D}, i.e., there exist a positive number k ∈N∗∪{∞},
a sequence τ0 = 0 < · · · < τk = ∞ of increasing times and a sequence (0)P, . . . , (k)P of
stochastic matrices such that for any l ∈N, l ≤ k, for any t ∈ {τl , . . . ,τl+1−1} and any
x,y ∈ E, x0:(t−1) = (x0, . . . ,xt−1) ∈ Et , the following Markov property holds:
P
(
X(t+1) = y|X(t) = x,X(0 : (t−1)) = x0:(t−1)
)
=P(X(t+1) = y|X(t) = x)= (l)pxy,
where X(0 : (t−1)) = (X(0), . . . ,X(t−1)) and (l)pxy denotes the transition probability
from x to y according to the matrix (l)P.
Assumption 2 means that the rating process evolves according to a Markovian dy-
namic which may change in time. The Markovian assumption is widely used in finan-
cial literature concerning credit rating dynamics (see e.g. [2], [4], [22], [24]), most of
all being concerned with sovereign credit ratings (see e.g., [19], [20], [26] and [31]).
In our model, the homogeneity property is limited to some sub-periods composing
the time line. This is motivated by the existence of some events that result in abrupt
changes in financial situations of countries or rating policies (such as a financial cri-
sis). The parameter k in Assumption 2 represents the number of such abrupt changes.
The time intervals {τl , . . . ,τl+1−1}, for l ∈ {0, . . . ,k−1} correspond to the periods on
which the rating dynamics are fixed and described by the transition matrix (l)P. The de-
tection of these abrupt changes ( also called change-points) for homogeneous Markov
chain are studied in [27], [32] and [33], but it has been never applied to this financial
problem.
Assumption 3. For any time t ∈N and any country c∈C , the conditional distribution
of the credit spread Sc(t) knowing Xc(t)= x, with x∈E, does not depend on t, nor c; we
denote it Fx and assume that Fx is continuous, with density function fx. Mathematically,
Fx :=D(Sc(t)|Xc(t) = x), for any t ∈ N,c ∈ C . (2)
In the following, we will denote Wx a random variable with distribution Fx; it will be
substituted to Sc(t), restricted to the event Xc(t) = x, when suitable, for simplifying
expressions of some conditional expectations such as E(Sc(t)|Xc(t) = x) = E(Wx).
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Assumption 3 stems from the recognition regarding the influence on the credit
spread evolution of the rating dynamics. This is formalized through the assumption
of a common spread distribution for countries with the same rating assignment.
Assumption 4. For any time t ∈N, the conditional joint distribution of (S1(t), . . . ,SN(t))
knowing (X1(t) = x1, . . . ,XN(t) = xN), with (x1, . . . ,xN) ∈ EN is given by
D(S1(t), . . . ,SN(t)|X1(t) = x1, . . . ,XN(t) = xN) =Cθ (Fx1 , . . . ,FxN ),
where Fx, x ∈ E are given by (2) and Cθ is a parametric copula, with dependence
parameter θ .
In the following, for a given N-tuple x = (x1, . . . ,xN) ∈ EN , we will denote Wx :=
(Wx1 , . . . ,WxN ) a random vector with distribution Cθ (Fx1 , . . . ,FxN ).
According to Assumption 4, the multivariate stochastic process (S1, . . . ,SN) de-
scribing the credit spread evolution, is controlled by the Markov chains Xc, c ∈ C ,
melt by some parametric copula. The use of the copula is justified by the existence of
some dependences between the credit spreads of countries that the model has to render.
4 Financial risk indicators
In this section we introduce the definition of the inequality measure advanced by Theil
and its generalization for stochastic processes. Furthermore, two proxies of financial
risk are presented: the expected total credit spread paid by the whole group and the
co-variance between the total credit spread paid by two countries.
4.1 Dynamic Theil index
One of the most important index used as a measure of inequality is the Theil index [30].
It is closely related to the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution [29].
Given a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pN) on a finite set with cardinal N –
say {1, . . . ,N}, Theil index T (p) of p is defined as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence K(p|u) between p and the uniform distribution u, or equivalently, as the differ-
ence between log(N) and the Shannon entropy S(p). Precisely,
T (p) :=K(p|u) :=
N
∑
i=1
pi log(N · pi) = log(N)−S(p), (3)
where S(p) =−∑Ni=1 pi log pi.
The definition of Theil index has been extended for stochastic processes by [7]; see
also [8] for an additive decomposition of this index. Based on these references, we
now introduce the dynamic Theil index of credit spreads, which we use to assess the
inequality of the financial risk distribution.
Let the share of credit spread of a country c ∈ C at time t ∈ N be defined as the
proportion of its credit spread Sc(t) relative to the sum – or total, of credit spreads of
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all countries T S(t) := ∑d∈C Sd(t); mathematically,
shc(t) =
Sc(t)
T S(t)
=
Sc(t)
∑
d∈C
Sd(t)
.
The vector of shares of credit spreads at time sh(t) := (shc(t))c∈C defines a probabil-
ity distribution on the set of countries C . Note that sh := (sh(t)t∈N) is a stochastic
process (taking its values in the set of probability distributions on C ) that depends on
the stochastic processes Sc, c ∈ C . We call dynamic Theil index of credit spread, the
stochastic process DT (sh(t)), namely
DT (sh(t)) = ∑
c∈C
shc(t) log(N · shc(t)), t ∈ N. (4)
Both deterministic and dynamic Theil indices satisfy the following properties, that
immediately stem from Shannon entropy’s or KL divergence’s (see e.g., [5, Chapter
2]); they are formulated here for dynamic Theil entropy:
1. DT (sh(t)) belongs to [0, log(N)] for any t ∈ N, the lower and the upper bounds
are achieved respectively for the uniform distribution and for any Dirac measure.
The lower bound corresponds to the perfect equi-distribution of financial risk as
all countries pay the same amount of the credit spread. On the other hand, the
upper bound refers to the concentration of the financial risk as one country pays
the total spread.
2. It is additively decomposable. Particularly, if we denote gx(t) := {c∈C : Xc(t)=
x} the subset of countries with rating assignment x∈ {1, . . . ,D} at time t ∈N, the
dynamic Theil index DT (sh(t)) is the sum of the Theil index of the distribution
of share of credit spread by subset q(t) = (q1, . . . ,qD), where
qx = ∑
c∈gx
shc, x ∈ {1, . . . ,D}
and of the average of Theil indices of subsets. Namely, dropping out the depen-
dence in time in notations for sake of simplicity,
DT (sh(t)) = DT (q)+
D
∑
x=1
qx ∑
c∈gx
shc|gx logshc|gx , (5)
where shc|gx =
shc
qx
, for c ∈ gx represents the conditional distribution of share of
credit spread of country c knowing that c belongs to subset gx (i.e., its rating
assignment is x). DT (q) is the inequality measure between rating classes gx,
x = 1, . . . ,D – say the inter-class inequality measure, while
D
∑
x=1
qx ∑
c∈gx
shc|gx logshc|gx =
D
∑
x=1
qxDT (sh.|gx),
is a measure of the inequality within groups – say the intra-group inequality
measure.
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3. It is sensitive to the transfer of credit spreads in the population. This means that
the Theil index is more sensitive to migration in the lower tail of the distribution
of the credit spreads than it is to migration in the upper tail.
4. It is invariant with respect to class permutation. This means that its value would
be close to zero if all c ∈ C paid similar credit spreads, disregarding the amount
of credit spreads, e.g. the class occupied by all countries. Furthermore, with
increasing value of the credit spreads, DT (sh(t)) become smaller.
The dynamic Theil index is better summarized by computing the first order mo-
ment, E0[DT (sh(t))].
Proposition 1. According to assumptions A1 - A4:
E0[DT (sh(t))] =
N
∑
i=1
∑
(a1,...,aN)∈EN
 N∏
h=1
∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E l
l−1
∏
d=0
(d)P(τd+1−τd)bd ,bd+1 ·
(l) P(t−τd+1)bd+1,ah

·
∫ +∞
0
· · ·
∫ +∞
0
E
(
zai
∑Nj= za j
logN
zai
∑Nj= za j
)
f(a1,...,aN) (za1 ,za2 , . . . ,zaN |dza1 ,dza2 , . . . ,dzaN ) .
(6)
where,
fX1(t)...XN(t) =
∂NFX1...XN
∂y1 · · ·∂yN = cθ
(
FX1(t)(y1), . . . ,FXN(t)(yN)
)
fX1(t)(y1) · . . . · fXN(t)(yN). (7)
Proof. Let (i1, . . . , iN) be the vector collecting the rating assignments of all N countries
at the initial time t = 0 and let (a1, . . . ,aN) the vector collecting the rating assignment
in a given future period t. The expected value is given by
E0 [T (p(t))] = E0
[
N
∑
i=1
pi(t) log(N pi(t))
]
=
N
∑
i=1
E
[
Si(t)
∑Nj=1 S j(t)
log
(
N · S
i(t)
∑Nj=1 S j(t)
)]
(8)
=
N
∑
i=1
E
[
E
[
Si(t)
∑Nj=1 S j(t)
log
(
N · S
i(t)
∑Nj=1 S j(t)
)∣∣∣∣(X1(t), . . . ,XN(t))
]]
, (9)
According to the assumption A3 (9) becomes;
E0 [DT (sh(t))] =
N
∑
i=1
∑
(a1,...,aN)∈EN
P
(
X1(t) = a1, . . . ,XN(t) = aN |X1(0) = i1, . . . ,XN(0) = iN
)
·E
[
Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
log
(
N · Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
)]
(10)
From the piecewise Markov chain assumption (A2) it follows that, given t ∈ N,
∃ l ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,k} : t ∈ {τl , . . . ,τl+1−1}. (11)
and thus, that
P
(
Xh(t) = ah|Xh(0) = ih
)
=
= ∑
b1∈E
∑
b2∈E
· · · ∑
bl∈E
P
(
Xh(t) = ah,X
h(τl) = bl , . . . ,Xh(τ2) = b2,Xh(τ1) = b1|Xh(0) = i0
)
,
(12)
10
which can be rewritten as
P
(
Xh(t) = ah|Xh(0) = ih
)
= ∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E
P
(
Xh(t) = ah|Xh(τl) = bl
)
·P
(
Xh(τl) = bl |Xh(τl−1) = bl−1
)
· . . .
·P
(
Xh(τ2) = b2|Xh(τ1) = b1
)
·P
(
Xh(τ1) = b1|Xh(0) = i0
)
= ∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E
(l)P(t−τl)bl ,ah ·
(l−1) P(τl−τl−1)bl−1,bl · ... ·
(1) P(τ2−τ1)b1,b2 ·
(0) P(τ1)i0,b1
= ∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E
l−1
∏
d=0
(d)P(τd+1−τd)bd ,bd+1 ·
(l) P(t−τd+1)bd+1,ah .
(13)
Therefore, by substitution of (13) into (10) we obtain
E0[DT (sh(t))] =
N
∑
i=1
∑
(a1,...,aN)∈EN
 N∏
h=1
∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E l
l−1
∏
d=0
.(d)P(τd+1−τd)bd ,bd+1 ·
(l)P(t−τd+1)bd+1,ah

·E
[
Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
log
(
N · Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
)]
.
(14)
Finally, the last term of (14) can be computed, under assumptions A4, according to:
E
[
Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
log
(
N · Wai
∑Nj=1 Wa j
)]
=
∫ +∞
0
· · ·
∫ +∞
0
(
zai
∑Nj= za j
logN
zai
∑Nj= za j
)
f(a1,...,aN) (za1 ,za2 , . . . ,zaN |dza1 ,dza2 , . . . ,dzaN ) .
(15)
and thus, (6) holds.
4.2 The total credit spread
As discussed in Section 4.1 the Theil index, both in its deterministic and dynamic
formalization, is invariant with respect to class permutation. Thus, a measure of the
total risk is needed to better understand and interpret the financial risk. For seek of
clarity, let make a very simple example. Suppose we have two situations where five
countries pay, for four periods, the credit spread shown in Table 3. The total spread paid
case 1 a b c d e case 2 a b c d e
t = 1 2 4 5 6 3 t = 1 2 4 5 6 3
t = 2 12 14 15 16 13 t = 2 3 5 6 7 4
t = 3 22 24 25 26 23 t = 3 4 6 7 8 5
t = 4 32 34 35 36 33 t = 4 5 7 8 9 6
Table 3: Credit spread paid by five agents for four periods.
by the sample in the two different situations is TC1 = {20,70,120,170} and TC2 =
{20,25,30,35}. The resulting inequality measure, computed according to Equation
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Figure 5: Theil index and Total spread computed for the first case -dashed line- and for
the second one -continuous line
(3), is shown in the Figure 5, along with the total spread relative variation. Although
the differences among countries are the same in both cases, the value of the Theil
index is lower in the first case, corresponding to the higher values of the total spread.
By considering only the inequality measure, the results suggest that the best situation
is that regarding the first case. For instance, the indices start from the same value,
i.e. 0.065 corresponding to the black circle in the figure, but they evolve differently,
reaching 0.0009 for the first case and 0.02 in the second case (the ending values are
represented by the two rectangles). However, while looking at variation of the total
spread, the second sample shows a better situation as the total spread is lower and it
increases more gradually that the first one. Thus, the evolution of the two measures
should be considered together in order to precisely evaluate the financial risk with
respect to its distribution among countries and to the amount of it over a given period.
To quantify the total credit spread paid the whole sample we proceed as follows.
Let denote b0 = xc(0) = i and define ∀c ∈ C , ∀t ∈ [τl ,τl+1−1]
[1:l]P(t)i j = P(X(t) = j|X(0) = i) , (16)
the transition probability from state i to state j in any given sub-periods. According to
(13), it is given by
[1:l]P(t)i j = ∑
(b1,...,bl)∈E l
l−1
∏
d=0
(d)P(τd+1−τd)bd ,bd+1 ·
(l)P(t−τd+1)bd+1, j . (17)
Definition 2. The expected total credit spread paid by country c given its rating as-
signment, is defined as
Vi(t) = E[TCc(0, t)] := E
[
t
∑
s=1
D
∑
j=1
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}Sc(s)
]
. (18)
Proposition 3. Under assumptions A1 - A4 the expected total credit spread paid by
country c is given by:
Vi(t) =Vi(t−1)+
D
∑
j=1
[1:l]P(t)i j ·
∫ +∞
0
F j(y)dy, (19)
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where F j(y) is the survival function.
Proof. Vi(t) can be found recursively. Thus, we can decompose (18) in the following
way:
Vi(t) = E
[
t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
j=1
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}Sc(s)
]
+E
[
D
∑
j=1
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}Sc(t)
]
, (20)
Under assumption A3 and by Definition 2, Equation (20) can be rewritten as
Vi(t) =Vi(t−1)+E
[
D
∑
j=1
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}Wj
]
=Vi(t−1)+
D
∑
j=1
E
[
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}
] ·E[Wj]. (21)
Equation (19) holds once we observe that ∑Dj=1E
[
1{Xc(t)= j|Xc(0)=i}
]
is equal to For-
mula (17) and that E[Wj] =
∫ +∞
0 F j(y)dy.
Remark 4. Once the expected credit spread paid by each country has been computed,
the expected total credit spread is given by:
V (t) = E[TC(0, t)] =
D
∑
j=1
n j(0) ·Vj(t), (22)
where the n j(0), denotes the initial number of countries allocated in rating class j.
Thus, one could understand if the financial risk is considerable or not, while the
measure of entropy suggests a measure of inequality.
4.3 Covariance between countries’ total credit spread.
The covariance between the total spread paid by two countries is a useful indicator
allowing to understand if the evolution of the credit spreads of some countries are
dependent. In order to compute this indicator we need the expected value of the product
of the total credit spread paid by two countries, i.e. V (α,β )aα ,aβ (t).
Definition 5. The expected value of the product of the total credit spread paid by two
countries is defined
V (α,β )aαaβ (t) := E
( t∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(s)
)
·
 t∑
s=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (s)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (s)
 ,
(23)
∀α,β ∈ C with Xα(0) = aα , Xβ (0) = aβ , ∀t ∈ [τl ,τl+1−1].
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Proposition 6. Under Assumptions A1-A4, that V (α,β )aαaβ (t) is given by
V (α,β )aαaβ (t) =V
(α,β )
aαaβ (t−1)+Vaα (t−1)
 D∑
jβ=1
[1:l]P(t)aβ , jβ ·
∫ +∞
0
F¯jβ (x)dx

+Vaβ (t−1)
(
D
∑
jα=1
[1:l]P(t)aα , jα ·
∫ +∞
0
F¯jα (x)dx
)
+
D
∑
jα=1
D
∑
jβ=1
[1:l]P(t)aα , jα
[1:l]P(t)aβ , jβ ·
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
z1 · z2 · f (α,β )jα , jβ (z1,z2)dz1dz2.
(24)
Proof. Similarly to the in proof in section 4.2, we can compute the expected value
recursively, so that
V (α,β )aαaβ (t) =E
[( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(s)+
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(t)
)
·
( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (s)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (s)+
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
)]
.
(25)
Multiplying member by member we obtain:
E
[( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(s)
)
·
( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (s)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (s)
)]
+ E
[( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(s)
)
·
( D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
)]
+ E
[( t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (s)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (s)
)
·
( D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(t)
)]
+E
[( D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(t)
)
·
( D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
)]
.
(26)
The first addendum of (26), by Definition 5, coincides with the expected value of the
product of the total credit spread paid by countries α and β at time t−1, i.e., V (α,β )aαaβ (t−
1). For the second addendum we have:
E
E
(t−1∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα }S
α (s)
)
·
 D∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
∣∣∣∣∣σ (X (α)(z),S(α)(z),X (β )(z),z≤ t−1)

= E
t−1∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα }S
α (s) ·E
 D∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
∣∣∣∣∣σ (X (α)(z),R(α)(z),X (β )(z),z≤ t−1)
 .
(27)
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Now, under assumption A1 (i.i.d. of X (α) and Xβ ) we have
E
 D∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }S
β (t)
∣∣∣∣∣σ (X (α)(z),S(α)(z),X (β )(z),z≤ t−1)
= D∑
jβ=1
E
[
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }Wjβ
∣∣∣∣X (β )(t−1)] .
(28)
Under assumption A3 and because of the Markov property, (28) can be rewritten as
D
∑
jβ=1
E
[
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (t−1)}
]
·E
[
Wjβ
]
=
D
∑
jβ=1
[1:l]P(t)
X(β )(t−1), jβ
·
∫ +∞
0
F jβ (y)dy. (29)
Thus, (27) becomes:
E
[
t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}S
α(s) · [1:l]P(t)
X(β )(t−1), jβ
·
∫ +∞
0
F jβ (y)dy
]
, (30)
which, for A1, can be rewritten as
E
[
t−1
∑
s=1
D
∑
jα=1
1{X(α)(s)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}WXα (s)
]
·E
[
[1:l]P(t)
X(β )(t−1), jβ
·
∫ +∞
0
F jβ (y)dy
]
=Vaα (t−1) ·
 D∑
jβ=1
[1:l]P(t)aβ , jβ ·
∫ +∞
0
F jβ (y)dy
 .
(31)
which gives us the second addendum of (26). The third addendum of (26) is symmetric
with respect to the second one, we only need to exchange α and β . Therefore:
Vaβ (t−1) ·
[
D
∑
jα=1
[1:l]P(t)aα , jα ·
∫ +∞
0
F jα (y)dy
]
. (32)
Regarding the last addendum of (26) we have:
E
[( D
∑
jα=1
1{X (α)(t)= jα |X (α)(0)=aα}WX (α)(t)
)
·
( D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }WXβ (t)
)]
= E
E
 D∑
jα=1
1{X (α)(t)= jα |X (α)(0)=aα}WX (α)(t)
)
·
( D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }WXβ (t)
∣∣∣∣X (α)(t),X (β )(t)
 .
(33)
Under assumption A4, from
=E
 D∑
jα=1
1{X (α)(t)= jα |X (α)(0)=aα}WX (α)(t)
)
·
(
D
∑
jβ=1
1{Xβ (t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ }WXβ (t)
 ∣∣∣∣X (α)(t),X (β )(t)
 ,
(34)
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we obtain
D
∑
jα=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα |X(α)(0)=aα}1{X(β )(t)= jβ |Xβ (0)=aβ } ·E
[
WX(α)(t) ·WX(β )(t)
]
=
D
∑
jα=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα ,X(β )(t)= jβ } ·
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
f (α,β )
X(α)(t),X(β )(t)
(z1,z2) · z1 · z2dz1dz2,
(35)
where
f (α,β )
X(α)(t),X(β )(t)
(z1,z2) =
∂ 2FX(α)(t),X(β )(t)(z1,z2)
∂ z1∂ z2
. (36)
Thus, the last addendum of (26) will be given by
E
 D∑
jα=1
D
∑
jβ=1
1{X(α)(t)= jα ,X(β )(t)= jβ } ·
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
f (α,β )
X(α)(t),X(β )(t)
(z1,z2) · z1 · z2dz1dz2
 ,
(37)
which leads to
=
D
∑
jα=1
D
∑
jβ=1
[1:l]P(t)aα , jα
[1:l]P(t)aβ , jβ ·
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
z1 · z2 · f (α,β )jα , jβ (z1,z2)dz1dz2. (38)
Remark 7. Propositions 3-6 allow to compute the covariance between the total credit
spread paid by two countries in the following way:
σ (α,β )jα , jβ (t) =Cov
(
TC(α)(0, t),TC(β )(0, t)
)
=V (α,β )aαaβ (t)−Vaα (t) ·Vaβ (t). (39)
5 Results and Discussion
In this section we show the empirical results we have obtained by applying the whole
methodology to the data presented in Section 2. After a brief introduction of the
change-point detection algorithm, we move to the description and interpretation of the
results. In particular, for seek of synthesis, not all results are shown for all agencies.
However, the results are available under request.
5.1 Estimation of the piecewise homogeneous Markov chain (PHMC)
and the marginal distributions of the credit spread
The application starts from the detection of any breaks in the rating dynamics. This is
done in order to make the simulations more precise and accurate. In fact, if there are
some change-points, it is convenient using the dynamics for the rating process from the
last change-point onward. We rely on change-point detection theory. In particular we
use the off-line detection algorithm proprosed by Polansky [27].
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Given that we suppose the existence of some change-points but their position and
their number are unknown, we have to proceed as follows. We start by supposing that
there is one and more change-points; we apply the likelihood theory in order to detect
the exact position of the change-points. Finally, we find the optimal number of change
points (whose position is previously found) by means of the Bayesian information cri-
terion (BIC). The BIC allows to choose the best model to fit the observed data, by
balancing the goodness of fit of the model with the number of parameters required.
Therefore, when the change-points τ1, . . . ,τk are unknown parameters but the num-
ber k of change-points is known, the the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the
change-points, i.e. , τˆ1, . . . , τˆk, is estimated by maximizing the likelihood function.
(τˆ1, . . . , τˆk) = argmax
τ1<···<τk∈{1,...,n−1}
{ k
∑
m=0
L(τm,τm+1)
}
, (40)
where ∑km=0 L(τm,τm+1) is the observed likelihood function conditional on the chang-
ing points (details about the computation of the likelihood function can be found in
[27]). To understand if the breaks we have found result on abrupt changes in the rating
process we test H0 : (0)P = · · ·= (k)P against H1 : (0)P 6= · · · 6= (k)P.
The test statistic Λ applied to the sequences of observations xc(1) . . . ,xc(s), ∀c∈C ,
is computed as follows:
Λ=
k
∑
m=1
∑
c∈C
s
∑
i=1
p(m)i j (x
c
i ,x
c
i+1)
p(m−1)i j (x
c
i ,x
c
i+1)
, (41)
which holds to the following Equation:
Λ= 2
( k
∑
m=1
L(τm,τm+1)−L(τ0,τk+1)
)
. (42)
When the change-points are known, Λ asymptotically tends to a χ2 distribution with
D(D−1)k degrees of freedom. On the contrary, when the change-points are unknown,
the critical value of the test is derived using the bootstrap simulation (for further details
on this techinque see [27]). The null hypothesis, with significance level α , is rejected
if Λ> Λ|1−α|.
Lastly, a model selection is required in order to avoid problem of over-fitting due
to a great amount of parameters. Thus, the BIC allows to choose the best model to fit
the observed data, by balancing the goodness of fit with the number of parameters. It
is defined as:
BIC(k) = log(s) ·D(D−1) · (k+1)−2
k
∑
m=0
L
(
τˆm, τˆm+1
)
, (43)
where the first term on the right side of (43) denotes the number of unknown parameters
and the second one the goodness of fit of the model. The optimal number of change-
points is detected by minimizing the BIC previously computed for k = 0,1, ...K, with
K is arbitrarily chosen.
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The change-point detection algorithm is applied to the observed rating data for
the three agencies. It is worth noting that, as we are working on a daily scale, the
observations are 128976 for each agency. Find out the position of the change-points
when k = 2,3 creates computational issues, mostly related to the huge amount of time
required. To overcome this problem, we firstly detect the breaks on a monthly scale.
Then, we use the results to build a range of time, on a daily scale, within whom the
algorithm is carried out. Furthermore, the algorithm is embarrassingly parallel allowing
for more speed without loosing informations over the data.
S&P
k 0 1 2 3
L -542.61 -483.51 -447.98 -427.46
Parameters 15 24 36 48
BIC 1214.1 1070.1 1205.2 1267.2
Moody’s
k 0 1 2 3
L -470.70 415.06 -391.33 -361.76
Parameters 16 32 42 36
BIC 1078.83 1104.98 1143.42 1032.74
Fitch
k 0 1 2 3
L -530.02 -496.57 -469.41 -472.59
Parameters 14 24 30 40
BIC 1180.30 1199.29 1196.51 1288.75
Table 4: Results from change-points detection algorithm
Table 4 gives results about the number of change-points (k), the maximum likeli-
hood function (L), the number of parameters3 and the value of the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (BIC). According to our results, the best model for S&P is that including
one change-point, detected on January 12, 2012. For Fitch there are no change-points.
For Moody’s the best model includes three change-points: November 11, 2002; March
30, 2009 and April 29, 2013. These findings are supported by the results of statistical
test Λ at a significance level of 0.05 as shown in Table (5) To compute the expected
Λ0.95 Λ p-value
S&P 262.659 447.228 0.0099
Moody’s 8.369 217.878 0.0049
Table 5: Results of the statistical test: Λ0.95 stems from the bootstrap simulation; Λ is
the statistic computed on the observed data.
inequality and the other measures we proposed in Section 4, the transition probability
matrix is estimated using data from the last changing point onward. In particular, for
3In our application, the number of parameters is equal to |G| where G = {Pi j : Pi j > 0, i 6= j}
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Fitch we use the whole observed rating trajectories because no change-points was de-
tected. Table (6) represents the transition probability matrix resulting from the S&P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.99948 5.15e−04 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 9.71e−05 0.99971 1.94e−04 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0.99954 4.57e−04 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 3.77e−04 0.99934 2.83e−04 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 6.02e−04 0.9994 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0.99931 6.92e−04 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0.00208 0.99375 0.00417
8 0 0 0 0 0 0.01333 0.01333 0.97333
Table 6: Transition probability matrix after the change-point (2012−01−12)
data related to the last sub-period. The probability of maintaining the current state is
very high and it is decreasing as the credit quality goes down. Furthermore, for rating
classes A and B ( i.e. gi ∈ [3,6]) there is no probability of upgrade.
We compute the Jafry Schuermann distance dJS (see [22]) in order to compare the
transition probability matrix of the PHMC with that of the traditional HMC. The index
proposed in Jafry and Schuermann measures the average probability of transition by
assessing the mean of all singular values λi of the product P˜
′P˜, where P˜′ is the transpose
of the mobility matrix P˜. In particular, P˜ = P− I, where I is the identity matrix with
the same dimension as the original transition probability matrix P:
MSV D(P) =
∑Ni=1
√
λi(P˜′P˜)
N
, (44)
This metric can be interpreted as a proxy of the average transition probability of a given
migration matrix.
Then, the difference is calculated by comparing the average singular value (ob-
tained in Formula (44)) of the three matrices:
DJS = MSV D((k)P)−MSV D(P). (45)
where (k)P denotes the transition probability matrix of the PHMC and P denotes that
of the HMC. This metric is very close to zero (dJS = 1.42e− 04 for S&P and dJS =
3.63e−04 for Moody’s). Thus, there is almost the same average transition probability
in both cases, although the test exposed above said us that the PHMC are significantly
different. This measure is also applied to compare the matrices of all agencies, we
observe that the value of the distance ranges between 0.039 and 0.044 as described in
the Table (7):
Regarding the credit spread, to compute the multivariate distribution we make use
of a Copula applied to the distribution of N countries’ credit spread. In particular,
according to Assumption A3, the marginal distributions we need are those related to
the rating classes. Figure (6) represents the empirical credit spread distribution for all
rating classes, resulting from S&P data. The credit spread are expressed in basis point
values. Each sub-figure shows the empirical c.d.f. starting from rank=1 to rank=7.
Moreover, some descriptive statistics related to those distributions are shown in Table
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Fitch Moody’s S&P
Fitch - 0.043805 0.039829
Moody’s -0.043805 - -0.0039757
S&P -0.039829 0.0039757 -
Table 7: dJS applied to the transition matrices of all agencies.
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Figure 6: Empirical distributions for rating class with S&P data.
(8). Not surprisingly, the average value increases as the credit quality gets worst (i.e.
from rank=1 to rank=8). Higher risk perceived corresponds to a higher cost of debt and
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rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
sample 13272 11896 11221 12784 7376 1472 632 75
Mean 0,321 0,696 1,700 2,750 3,834 7,053 17,356 21,029
st.dev. 0.350 0.772 1.298 1.635 1.954 2.254 8.344 7.451
Skew 1.743 2.651 1.120 1.731 1.805 0.341 0.466 1.169
Kurt 6.056 11.882 3.702 7.914 6.982 2.656 1.969 3.199
Table 8: Descriptive statistic of credit spread distribution with S&P data.
this cost is more variable as the credit quality decreases. Furthermore, the number of
observations for the investment rating classes (i.e. rank=1, ..., 4) are larger with respect
to the speculative rating classes (rank = 5, ... ,8).
The spread distributions are tested in order to understand if the use of different
distributions for the rating classes is justified by a significant dissimilarity between
them. The results of the Anova test confirmed that the spread distributions are different,
at a significance level of 0.05.
Fitch Moody’s S&P
F 11934,41 11725.85 17554.65
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 9: Anova test within all rating agencies.
5.2 Assessing the financial inequality and the total credit spread.
The financial risk inequality is assessed by means of the expected value of the dy-
namic Theil entropy as shown in Section 4.1. This requires the set of all possible
configurations stemming from 24 countries and 8 rating class (2 629 575). To avoid
computational problems due to the huge amount of combinations, the Monte Carlo is
carried out starting from modelling rating trajectories according to (k)Pi j for each rat-
ing agency. In particular, by observing the initial configuration of countries, if a given
country c visited the state i at time t we take the c.d.f. of the probability distribution
for this state (i.e. pi,·). After that, a pseudo-random number u ∈ [0,1] is generated such
that, if
k
∑
j=1
pi, j ≤ u(t)<
k+1
∑
j=1
pi, j, ∀i,k ∈ E,
the next rating class visited by country c at time t+1 would be equal to k. This is done
for a horizon period of three years starting from the allocation of countries observed
at the end of our datasets. Then, the spread dynamics are also simulated, according
to the rating simulated at each time t, by extracting the spread from a multivariate
distribution. This is done by applying a Gaussian Copula to the empirical distribution
of the rating classes shown in the previous section. In order to better simulate the
future payments we estimate the relative variation of the observed credit spread paid
by each country. Once the spread dynamics are generated, the inequality DT (sh(t))
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is computed for each Monte Carlo iteration. This process has been performed for 200
iterations. Finally, the first order moment, i.e. E [T DT (sh(t))] is computed through
the mean of the inequalities over all iterations. Figure (7) shows the evolution of the
expected dynamic Theil entropy along with the variation of the Expected total credit
spread, i.e. ∆V (t) =V (t)−V (t−1). The absolute variation of the total credit spread is
expressed in percentage value. The initial and ending values are represented by a circle
and a rectangle, respectively.
Figure 7: Expected inequality and absolute variation of the the total credit spread for
all agencies
The expected inequality shows an upward trend for all three agencies. Starting
from the same value, 0.47 (abscissas of circle points), the expected inequality evolves
differently among the rating agencies. In the case of Standard & Poor’s it increases
of about the 23% of the initial value ending with value equal to 0.578 (abscissa of
rectangle point of S&P curve). For Fitch the inequality goes up until 0.721 (abscissa
of rectangle point of Fitch curve). The highest one is that computed for Moody’s: the
expected inequality, in fact, grows more than the other agencies and, at end of the
horizon time, is 0.91 (abscissa of rectangle point of Moody’s curve). These results
suggests that, in all cases, the financial risk would be less equi-distributed after three
years.
On the ordinate axis of the Figure (7) the variation of the expected total credit
spread is shown. It expresses the speed of growth of the expected total credit spread
over time. ∆V (t)S&P increases over the period ranging between 39.625 (ordinate of
circle point of S&P curve) and 44.638 (ordinate of rectangle point of S&P curve). In
a similar way ∆V (t)Fitch increases but ranging between 40.331 and 42.340. On the
contrary, ∆V (t)Moody′s slowly decreases over time starting from 41.646 up to 40.205.
The expected total credit spread helps us to quantify the size of the financial risk
and to better interpret the evolution of the financial risk. Table (10) shows the values
of the total credit spread at the beginning or the simulation, after the first two years and
at the ed of our simulations. The value are expressed in percentage and for the three
agencies. By looking at the Table (10), it is evident that the evolution of this indicator
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t = 0 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
Moody’s 41.648 15106.994 30032.948 44789.140
Fitch 40.325 14994.514 30272.184 45677.702
S&P 39.615 14995.465 30659.464 46759.857
Table 10: V (t) = E[TC(0, t)] for all agencies.
is different among rating agencies. After the first year Moody’s agency has the highest
total payment, followed by S&P. On the contrary, starting from the second year the
total credit spread computed for Moody’s has the smallest value followed by Fitch.
This can be summarize as follows. In the scenario of S&P there would be more
equi-distribution than the other agencies. However, the amount of the financial risk
is higher and it increases faster than the other agencies.Furthermore, with Fitch data
E [DT (sh(t))] increases more than S&P but the total credit spread increases at lower
rates. These results suggest that also in this case there are some countries paying more
than the others but the difference among countries is higher even if the total risk is
smaller. Finally, in the scenario simulated using Moody’s data E [DT (sh(t))] goes
up of almost the 90% of its observed value, but the total credit spread increases at
decreasing rates meaning that the increasing spread is paid by a subgroup of countries
that is smaller than in the other two scenarios.
The property of decomposition of the dynamic Theil index allows to investigate the
influence of the rating dynamics on the financial risk inequality assessment. Figure (8)
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Figure 8: Inter and Intra - class inequality measure for all agencies
shows the dynamic inequality measure decomposed into inter - inequality (left panel)
and intra - inequality (right panel). The inter - inequality assess the dispersion of the
financial risk between rating classes. The intra - inequality is the inequality within rat-
ing classes, computed on the conditional share of credit spread knowing the allocation
of each country in a given rating class. According to Figure (8) the intra-inequality
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measure is increasing for all agencies, with Moody’s being the one with the largest val-
ues, followed by Fitch and S&P. On the other side, the inter-inequality measure shows
different trends. As a matter of fact, for Moody’s it is increasing, explaining the strong
growth of the financial risk inequality for this agency. On the contrary, for the other
agencies the inequality computed between rating classes is decreasing. In particular,
for Fitch it falls very slowly until the middle of the simulated period. After it remains
almost stable. Thus, the rise of the financial inequality is explained by the evolution of
the intra-class inequality. While, in the case of S&P, the inter-class inequality decreases
over time of about the 23%. As the intra-class inequality increases, the resulting in-
equality of the financial risk goes up (as shown in Figure 7). We observe that higher
values of the inter-inequality measure imply a strong explanatory power of the rating
classes. On the contrary, lower values of the inter-inequality measure denote a relative
small influence of the credit rating while explaining the inequality evolution.
5.3 The covariance between countries’ total credit spread and the
correlation structure
The last result concerns the covariance between countries’ total credit spread as de-
scribed in Section 4.3. To better interpret the results we compute the coefficient of
correlation. We will denote this coefficient as ρα,βjα , jβ (t). Figures (9-10) compare the
correlation coefficients estimated on the cumulative observed spread, i.e. ρα,β on the
left panel, with ρα,βjα , jβ (t) computed using S&P data on the right panel. In particular,
the value of ρα,βjα , jβ (t) is taken in the middle of the simulated period, i.e. t = 547.
So that ρα,β is estimated on the total spread paid by all countries computed on the
observed data and over the same time-length. Figure (9) illustrates the coefficients
between Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom and all other countries. As high-
lighted above, this group is negatively correlated with the rest of EU, except with its
components. The structure of ρα,βjα , jβ (t) is close to that of ρ
α,β , and the value of the
correlation coefficient are almost similar. As a matter of example, ρα,βjα , jβ (t) = 0.81 and
ρα,β = 0.83 between Denmark and United Kingdom or between United Kingdom and
Italy ρα,βjα , jβ (t) =−0.96 and ρα,β =−0.93. The same is true for the countries showed
in Figure (10): Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovenia. For instance, the correlation
between Belgium and Bulgaria computed from the model is 0.84, while that computed
on the observed data is 0.82. However, although the values are very close, there exist
some exceptions. The difference between ρα,βjα , jβ (t) and ρ
α,β between Bulgaria and
Denmark is 33.83%, while between Italy and Sweden is 33.35%.
This results denote that the correlation structure is well reproduced by the model.
Moreover, there is a very strong positive correlation between the most of countries
while a strong negative correlation would characterize the dependence structure be-
tween Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom with respect to all other countries.
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Figure 9: Correlation coefficient computed on observed and simulated data: Den-
mamrk, Sweden and United Kingdom
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Figure 10: Correlation coefficient computed on observed and simulated data: Bulgaria,
Czech Republic and Slovenia
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a copula based Markov reward approach to investigate the
financial risk in European Union. The novelty of this approach consists on the use
of the piecewise homogeneous Markov chain to describe rating dynamics and on the
inclusion of a stochastic process describing the spread evolution and its dependence
among countries. In particular the financial risk is evaluated by focusing on its dis-
tribution by means of generalized measure of inequality and on its total amount. The
latter is analysed by computing the total financial risk in a recursive way including
every possible evolution of countries’ rating assignment. The methodology proposed
has been applied to real data concerning sovereign credit rating assigned by Moody’s,
Fitch and S&P and sovereign credit spreads. Obtained results suggest that the financial
risk will be less equi-distributed over the next future. The dynamic inequality shows
an increasing trend, mostly driven by the intra-inequality measure, at a different rate
for different rating agencies. Differences are highlighted also on the evolution of the
total risk, whose speed of growth is increasing for S&P and Fitch, but decreasing for
Moody,s. Furthermore, the investigation of the dependence structure reveals a strong
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correlation between countries both on the historical data and on those simulated by our
model.
The decomposition of the dynamic inequality into inter and intra components permits
to assess the explanatory power of the rating variables and how it evolves over time.
Investigating this topic, could be helpful for policies aiming to control the financial risk
within a given group of countries. Furthermore, the methodology is a potential tool to
be applied to other financial problems such as portfolio loan management having the
purpose to reduce the credit risk exposure. Finally, we think that possible extensions
consist in the introduction of other economic and financial variables to give a better
explanation about the financial risk, in terms of its inequality and its quantification, by
adding other sources of dependence.
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